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SUMMARY 
 
The Court of Appeal’s decision in Mrs Mba’s case is notable because: (a) 
it rejects the qualitative evaluation of her Sabbatarian belief as a “core 
component” of Christianity in assessing for the purposes of domestic anti-
discrimination legislation the proportionality of her employer’s requirement 
for her to work Sundays; (b) it continues to keep minimal the size of the group 
required to show group disadvantage; and (c) per Elias LJ and Vos LJ, it finds 
the assessment of group disadvantage to be incompatible with Article 9 when 
the ECHR is engaged. The case represents the continued move from a group 
to an individual focus, and is welcome: it better protects personal religious 
freedoms. The logical conclusion is for domestic law to oblige employers to 
reasonably accommodate religious rights via a sui generis legal mechanism.  
 
INTRODUCTION/CASE SUMMARY 
 
Celestina Mba worked as a care worker in a children’s home, the 
Brightwell. She was rostered by her employer, the London Borough of 
Merton, to work on Sundays, in line with her contractual obligations of 
employment. She did not wish to work on Sundays for reasons connected to 
her religious beliefs as a Baptist Christian. After a final written warning 
(against which she unsuccessfully appealed) Mrs Mba resigned from her 
employment. She subsequently brought a claim alleging constructive unfair 
dismissal and discrimination against the council.1 
* Peter Smith, MA (Cantab), MPhil (Cantab). Employed barrister, Carter-Ruck, 6 St 
Andrew Street, EC4A 3AE. Member of the Denning Society (Lincoln’s Inn). 
1 Mba v Mayor and Burgesses of the London Borough of Merton [2013] EWCA Civ 
1562. 
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An employment tribunal concluded that although indirect discrimination2 
had occurred on the grounds of her religion, the policy, criterion or practice 
(PCP) applied by her employer in compelling her to work on the Sabbath was 
justified as a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim, the provision 
of round-the-clock care to disabled and other children at Brightwell.3 It noted 
that: 
 
“[W]e also need to weigh in the balance the discriminatory impact of 
the PCP upon [Mrs Mba]. We accept that the PCP impacted on her 
genuinely and deeply held religious belief and observance…However, 
in terms of the degree of disadvantage to her, we bear in mind the 
following particulars: 
 
(i) [The council] did make efforts to accommodate her in this respect 
for two years; 
(ii) [The council] was in any event prepared to arrange the shifts in a 
way that enabled her to attend church to worship each Sunday; and  
(iii) Her belief that Sunday should be a day of rest and worship upon 
which no paid employment was undertaken, whilst deeply held, is not 
a core component of the Christian faith… As much is as accepted in 
terms as… Bishop Nazir-Ali’s witness statement…, where he states 
that some Christians will not work on the Sabbath. To approach the 
matter in this way does not involve a secular court impermissibly 
adjudicating in evaluative terms upon religious beliefs…, as opposed 
to simply proceeding on the basis of evidence before it as to the 
components of the Christian faith.” 
 
The Court of Appeal, in assessing the tribunal’s reasoning on 
proportionality, considered the first two of the factors cited by the tribunal as 
irrelevant, and deemed its reasoning an error of law in relation to the third: 
whether not working on a Sunday was a “core component” of Mrs Mba’s 
2 Direct discrimination was not an issue. 
3 Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003, SI 2003/1660, reg 3 
reads: ‘(1) For the purposes of these Regulations, a person (‘A’) discriminates against 
another person (‘B’) if — (a) on grounds of religion or belief, A treats B less 
favourably than he treats or would treat other persons; or (b) A applies to B a 
provision, criterion or practice which he applies or would apply equally to persons not 
of the same religion or belief as B, but — (i) which puts or would put persons of the 
same religion or belief as B at a particular disadvantage when compared with other 
persons, (ii) which puts B at that disadvantage, and (iii) which A cannot show to be a 
proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.’ 
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faith.4 In doing so, it reversed the finding of the Employment Appeal 
Tribunal.5  
The Court considered that the correct approach to weighing the 
employee’s religion or belief in a proportionality assessment – the exercise of 
balancing the discriminatory impact on a protected religious practice or belief 
against the objectives of an employer – is neither strictly qualitative 
(“evaluating how important the belief is, so that it may be described as 
‘core’”) nor quantitative (“how many people who are adherent to the faith 
believe in that particular aspect or requirement of it”).6 The bench was split, 
however, on the relationship between the two positions and whether the 
numerical popularity of a religion or belief assisted the employer or employee. 
For Maurice Kay LJ, it was enough to ask whether a genuine religious 
belief was held by the claimant, following R (Williamson) v Secretary of State 
for Education and Employment.7 Provided it was shared by “some”8 
Christians (a test in favour of the employer) then that was sufficient for group 
disadvantage under the reg 3(b)(i). There was no need to consider quantity for 
the purposes of the proportionality assessment under reg 3(b)(iii) as, in any 
case, the popularity of a belief cut both ways: a minority belief could be 
interpreted as more or less deserving of protection.9 
4 The expert evidence of Bishop Michael Nazir-Ali was adduced to prove that, 
whereas many do not, some Christians follow closely the Fourth Commandment: 
‘Remember the Sabbath day to keep it holy. Six days shalt thou labour, and do all thy 
work: But the seventh day is the Sabbath of the Lord thy God: in it thou shalt not do 
any work.’: See Mba (n 1) [1], [13]. 
5 Ms C MBA v The Mayor and Burgesses of the London Borough of Merton [2013] 
ICR 658. Material parts of the Employment Appeal Tribunal decision are cited 
therein.  
6 Mba (n 1) [16]; Ms C MBA (n 6) [48]. 
7 [2005] 2 AC 246 (HL) [22] (Lord Nicholls): ‘When the genuineness of a claimant’s 
professed belief is an issue in the proceedings the court will inquire into and decide 
this issue as a question of fact. This is a limited inquiry. The court is concerned to 
ensure an assertion of religious belief is made in good faith: “neither fictitious, nor 
capricious, and that it is not an artifice”…But, emphatically, it is not for the court to 
embark on an inquiry into the asserted belief and judge its “validity” by some 
objective standard such as the source material upon which the claimant founds his 
belief on the orthodox teaching of the religion in question or the extent to which the 
claimant’s belief conforms to or differs from the views of others professing the same 
religion. Freedom of religion protects the subjective belief of an individual.’; Quoted 
at Mba (n 1) [13]. Religion or belief is a wide category: see Grainger plc and others v 
Nicholson [2010] ICR (EAT) 360: where an Employment Appeal Tribunal held that 
beliefs about climate change could amount to a protected belief.  
8 Mba (n 1) [18]. 
9 Ibid [19]. 
283 
 
                                                     
CASE COMMENTARY 
For Elias LJ (with whom Vos LJ largely agreed),10 the Court should 
engage in a more sophisticated analysis. If Article 9 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) was not engaged then the “extent”11 of 
the discriminatory impact as part of group disadvantage was relevant in the 
proportionality assessment also.12 Convention jurisprudence, by contrast, 
required no consideration of the group disadvantage of the discriminatory 
measure because of its focus on the rights and freedoms affecting one person: 
Eweida v United Kingdom.13 In tandem with the claim for indirect 
discrimination, Article 9 was engaged (albeit not directly enforceable in the 
employment tribunal) ostensibly because the respondent was a public 
authority although also, following Eweida, because of the positive obligation 
to safeguard the religious freedom protected under Article 9.  
Yet, because the concept of group disadvantage does not exist in 
Convention jurisprudence, Elias LJ recognised there was a problem: there was 
no way to read the requirements of the Convention and domestic legislation 
compatibly, as the Court was obliged to do.14 His criticism was significant: 
discrimination law cannot be read down to “ignore the need to establish group 
disadvantage” under reg 3(b)(i) when Article 9 was engaged. Instead, he read 
“the concept of justification [reg 3(b)(iii)] compatibly with Article 9 where 
that provision is in play. In that context it does not matter whether the 
claimant is disadvantaged along with others or not, and it cannot in any way 
weaken her case with respect to justification that her beliefs are not more 
widely shared or do not constitute a core belief of any particular religion”.15 
He observed that “paradoxically, if a belief is not widely shared, which is 
more likely to be the case where it is not a core belief of a particular religion, 
that is a factor which under Article 9 is likely to work in favour of the 
employee rather than against”.16 
Despite these errors, the Court declined to quash the employment tribunal 
findings against Mrs Mba, and she lost her case.  
10 Ibid [39]. 
11 Ibid [33]. 
12 The relevant part of Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights, as amended) 
(ECHR) 1950, art 9(2): ‘Freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief shall be subject 
only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic 
society…for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.’ 
13 Eweida v United Kingdom (2013) EHRR 8 [79]-[84]. 
14 Human Rights Act 1998, s 3(1): ‘So far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation 
and subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is 
compatible with the Convention rights.’ 
15 Mba (n 1) [35]. 
16 Ibid [36]. 
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The Court’s refocus on protecting individual religious practice or belief 
takes indirect discrimination in English law further away from the 
identification of the “core component” of an infringed religious practice or 
belief as part of assessing proportionality in the justification test as applied 
previously by the Court of Appeal in Islington London Borough Council v 
Ladele.17 Yet reading the Court’s decision in Mba is not a wholly satisfying 
activity. Although the 2003 Religion or Belief Regulations have been 
superseded by the Equality Act 2010, the problems inherent in assessing 
proportionality in any defence to a claim of indirect discrimination remain the 
same.18 Any proportionality assessment of the numbers of adherents to the 
religion or belief can assist either the employer or employee. The decision in 
Mba still leaves open the precise number of adherents – the meaning of 
“some” or “a few” – needed to satisfy the group disadvantage test under reg 
3(b)(i): as the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) has noted, there is “no 
consensus in law as to how large (or small) this cohort of others or ‘group’ 
must be in order to suffice”.19 Courts remain keen to refrain from evaluating 
the theological or philosophical importance of a religion or belief. 
United Kingdom (UK) equality laws remain “extremely complex” in the 
view of at least one specialist.20 To a certain extent, English discrimination 
law is stuck in a conceptual rut. Rather than adjudicating fairly between 
competing interests and protecting diverse values and freedoms, it has the 
potential to act as an expensive fetter on private enterprise and the public 
sector alike without reaching equitable decisions. Given these difficulties, 
what course should English law now take to protect religious rights and 
balance the needs of employers against those of employees? 
 
 
 
 
17 [2010] 1 WLR 955 (CA) [52] (Neuberger MR); Mba (n 1) [15]: where the 
claimant’s view of marriage was considered ‘not a core part of her religion’.  
18 See Lucy Vickers, ‘Religious Discrimination in the Workplace: An Emerging 
Hierarchy?’ (2010) 12 Ecc L J 280, 297 for criticisms of proportionality as applied in 
both contexts. 
19 Chatwal v Wandsworth Borough Council [2011] Eq LR 942 (EAT) [25]-[27]. See 
also Sir James Dingemans, Can Yeginsu, Tom Cross and Hafsah Masood, The 
Protections for Religions Rights: Law and Practice (OUP 2013) [6.76]-[6.82]. 
20 Gay Moon, ‘From Equal Treatment to Appropriate Treatment: What Lessons Can 
Canadian Equality Law on Dignity and on Reasonable Accommodation Teach the 
United Kingdom?’ (2006) 6 EHRLR 695, 695. 
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THE PROBLEMS WITH ANTI-DISCRIMINATION MEASURES 
DERIVED FROM EU LAW 
 
In a recent speech at Yale Law School, the Deputy President of the UK 
Supreme Court, Baroness Hale of Richmond, spoke about the clash between 
measures prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of religion and measures 
prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation.21 She 
distinguished two types of cases: those when Christian believers assert their 
beliefs against their employers or the State and with “no competing equality 
right in play”, as in Mrs. Mba’s case,22 and those where the manifestations of 
their beliefs cause Christians to deny goods or services from people on their 
grounds of their sexual orientation.23  
Most of these cases fall under UK anti-discrimination provisions created 
directly as a consequence of European Union (EU) law, especially the general 
principle of equal treatment embodied in the Framework Directive on Equal 
Treatment in Employment and Occupation24 and the subsequent package of 
domestic legislation. For instance, the 2003 Sexual Orientation Regulations25 
created mirror protections to the 2003 Religion or Belief Regulations, and 
both religion or belief and sex and sexual orientation are, alongside age, race, 
etc. “protected characteristics” under the Equality Act 2010.26 The prohibition 
21 Lady Hale, ‘Religion and Sexual Orientation: The Clash of Equality Rights’ 
(Comparative and Administrative Law Conference, 7 March 2014) 
<www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech-140307.pdf> accessed 10 May 2014. 
22 Gibson in Matthew Gibson, ‘The God “Dilution”? Religion, Discrimination and the 
Case for Reasonable Accommodation’ (2013) 72 CLJ 578, 585-6 divides this 
category into two further sets: cases concerning the employee’s wish to modify 
personal appearance in accordance with their religion or belief, and cases relating to 
the conflict between an employee’s obligation to attendance religious observance 
ceremonies and their scheduled work duties. The only ‘relevant appellate UK anti-
discrimination judgment’ he could find in the latter category is Mr N Cherfi v G4S 
Security Services Ltd [2011] WL 11519 (EAT), which only shallowly considers the 
proportionality exercise. 
23 Perhaps best known example of the latter is Bull and another v Hall and another 
[2013] UKSC 73, where the Bulls – Christian hoteliers who refused a double-bedded 
room to same-sex civil partners on the grounds of their blanket policy to let double 
accommodation to heterosexual married couples only – were found to be directly 
discriminating against Mr Hall and Mr Preddy.  
24 Council Directive (EC) 2000/78 establishing a general framework for equal 
treatment in employment and occupation. 
25 Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2003, SI 2003/1661. 
26 ‘Protected characteristics’ defined at Equality Act 2010, ss 4-12 and in s 19(3) in 
relation to indirect discrimination.  
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of indirect discrimination in the 2010 Act is very similar to that in reg 3 and it 
carries over the ambiguous language of group disadvantage and 
proportionality.27 
As shown in Mba through the differing approaches of Maurice Kay LJ on 
the one hand and Elias and Vos LJs on the other, domesticated EU law (in the 
form of the 2003 Religion or Belief Regulations) sit uncomfortably with the 
jurisprudence of Article 9. This comes in part from three differences drawn by 
Lady Hale between the two legal systems in their protection for religious 
rights.28  
Firstly, their contrasting spheres of operation. Through Article 14, the 
Convention protects against discrimination on the basis of rights protected 
therein. These rights are only enforceable vertically, against the State, unless 
the State has a positive obligation to ensure respect for a Convention right by 
private persons (as it does in regards to Article 9), an exception rather than the 
norm.29 EU law covers largely30 employment, occupation and training, as 
these are all part of establishing the common market in labour, but in both the 
private and public sectors.31  
Secondly, EU law defines and protects fewer characteristics than the 
ECHR, and the ECHR list is non-exhaustive: “all sorts of things have been 
27 Equality Act 2010, s 19: ‘(1) A person (A) discriminates against another (B) if A 
applies to B a provision, criterion or practice which is discriminatory in relation to a 
relevant protected characteristic of B’s. (2) For the purposes of subsection (1), a 
provision, criterion or practice is discriminatory in relation to a relevant protected 
characteristic of B’s if —(a) A applies, or would apply, it to persons with whom B 
does not share the characteristic, (b) it puts, or would put, persons with whom B 
shares the characteristic at a particular disadvantage when compared with persons 
with whom B does not share it, (c) it puts, or would put, B at that disadvantage, and 
(d) A cannot show it to be a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.’  
28 Ibid ss 4-5. 
29 ECHR (n 13) art 14: ‘Prohibition of discrimination. The enjoyment of the rights and 
freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any 
ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other 
status.’ 
30 See Council Directive (EC) 2000/43 implementing the principle of equal treatment 
between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin; for instances where the 
provisions of some goods and services are covered. The corresponding domestic 
legislation goes consistently further than EU law because it protects against 
discrimination in the supply of goods and services too. 
31 This situation will change when the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights becomes 
fully effective. Given its uncertain status in the UK, it is outside the scope of this 
analysis. 
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recognised under the ‘other status’ rubric, including where you live or the 
character of your sentence of imprisonment.”32  
Finally, EU and Convention jurisprudence take different approaches to 
justification. EU law distinguishes between direct and indirect discrimination 
and allows justification of the latter only – although identifying the species of 
discrimination can, as Lady Hale observed, be a fraught process.33 The 
Convention also recognises both forms of discrimination but either may be 
justified if a proportionate response to a legitimate aim.34 
Lady Hale’s view is that the Convention approach is “preferable” to the 
EU approach given the lack of a general defence of justification in the latter, 
which precludes courts and tribunals from “addressing the real issues” in 
discrimination cases such as legitimate aim, rational connection and the 
proportionality of a prima facie discriminatory measure. The exercise of 
distinguishing direct and indirect discrimination is, in effect, to distract the 
court from the real exercise at hand, viz. the administration of justice. 
She suggests a new approach to claims like Mrs Mba’s. “[I]nstead of all 
the technicalities which EU law has produced, would it not be a great deal 
simpler if we required the providers of employment, goods and services to 
make reasonable accommodation for the religious beliefs of others? We can 
get this out of the ECHR approach but not out of our anti-discrimination law 
(although it is well established there in relation to disability).”35  
Mrs Mba’s case, it is submitted, incrementally takes English law in that 
direction by blending Convention and EU law, by watering down group 
disadvantage for the purpose of reg 3 (and thus the 2010 Act), and by 
narrowing the factual inquiries in the assessment of proportionality. 
Especially where no other protected characteristic is in conflict, the 
reasonable accommodation approach provides a simpler solution, and one 
that, when the facts of Mrs Mba’s case, provides a fairer outcome. It is an idea 
whose time has come.  
 
THE REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION OF RELIGIOUS 
RIGHTS: AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH 
 
The reasonable accommodation of religious rights has emerged from 
numerous sources, including international jurisprudence (particularly in North 
32 Ibid s 4. 
33 Bull (n 24) and the similar case of Black and Morgan v Wilkinson [2013] EWCA 
Civ 820; both following James v Eastleigh Borough Council [1990] 2 AC 751 (HL).  
34 Such justifications being ‘prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic 
society’, as eg in ECHR (n 13) art 9(2). 
35 Ibid art 18. 
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America and the Strasbourg court) and academic discourse.36 It draws on the 
concept of “reasonable adjustment” in disability law37 as Lady Hale herself 
observed and has been suggested by the UK’s Equalities and Human Rights 
Commission38 as a viable mechanism. As far back as 2000, the Hepple Report 
proposed that a duty of reasonable adjustment should be extended to religion 
or belief39 and the notion has received the more recent blessing of a range of 
36 Kristin Henrard, ‘Duties of Reasonable Accommodation in Relation to Religion 
and the European Court of Human Rights: A Closer Look at the Prohibition of 
Discrimination, the Freedom of Religion and Related Duties of State Neutrality’ 
(2012) 5 Erasmus LR 59; Emmanuelle Bribosia, Julie Ringelheim and Isabelle 
Rorive, ‘Reasonable Accommodation for Religious Minorities: A Promising Concept 
for European Antidiscrimination Law?’ (2010) 17 MJ 137; Vickers (n 19); Moon (n 
21); Gibson (n 23).  
37 Equality Act 2010, ss 20-2 requires employers and providers of goods and services 
to make ‘reasonable adjustments’ to accommodate the needs of people with 
disabilities. This means that an employer must make sure that a person with 
disabilities has the same access, as far as is reasonable, to everything that is involved 
in getting and doing a job that a person without disabilities has. 
38 Equality and Human Rights Commission, ‘Religion or Belief in the Workplace: A 
Guide for Employers Following Recent European Court of Human Rights Judgments’ 
(Comission,  2013)  
<www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/documents/RoB/religion_or_belief
_in_the_workplace_a_guide_for_employers.pdf> accessed 10 June 2014: ‘The 
Equality and Human Rights Commission supports individuals' right to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion, and to conditional protection of the right to express 
religion or belief. It seeks to promote a balanced approach to recognising and 
managing religion or belief issues at work and to help employers and employees find 
reasonable solutions, wherever possible, and avoid complex, costly and damaging 
litigation. It is in the interests of all parties to try to find reasonable solutions through 
discussion, mutual respect and, where practical, mutual accommodation.’ The EHRC 
encourages employers ‘to take as their starting-point consideration as to how to 
accommodate the request unless there are cogent or compelling reasons not to do so, 
assessing the impact of the change on other employees, the operation of the business 
and other factors outlined below.’ Such factors include the cost, disruption and wider 
impact on business or work if the request is accommodated, whether there are health 
and safety implications for the proposed change, the disadvantage to the affected 
employee if the request is refused, the impact of any change on other employees, 
including on those who have a different religion or belief, or no religion or belief, the 
impact of any change on customers or service users, and whether work policies and 
practices to ensure uniformity and consistency are justifiable… 
39 Bob Hepple, Marry Coussey and Tufyal Choudhury, Equality: A New Framework, 
Report of the Independent Review of the Enforcement of UK Anti-Discrimination 
Legislation (Hart 2000) 49, recommendation 21. The Report was the forerunner to the 
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religious and secular opinion-formers.40 Moreover, it already exists as an 
embryonic concept in the context of religious rights exercised in employment 
situations, thanks to the Court of Appeal in Copsey v WBB Devon Clays 
Limited41 and Lady Hale’s judgment in Bull and another v Hall and another.42 
The Strasbourg court, too, has begun fashioning a right to reasonable 
accommodation as a way of achieving a legitimate aim that is least restrictive 
of rights and freedoms.43 
Some commentators argue that there is no need for reasonable 
accommodation of religion or belief in EU law because the justification test 
for indirect discrimination already includes a duty to so.44 However the point 
here is that, whatever its basis, whether reasonable accommodation is part of 
direct or indirect indiscrimination law or in fact a third sui generis legal 
mechanism, Mba’s case shows how its reasoning is penetrating UK anti-
discrimination jurisprudence. 
What does a reasonable accommodation test look like? The most 
developed model for a reasonable accommodation approach is that found in 
Canada.45 It is rooted in the 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms46 
general attempt to consolidate anti-discrimination measures in one Act, as was done 
in the Equality Acts 2006 and 2010. 
40 See the multiple contributors to the Christians in Parliament Adrian Hilton, Alec 
Bounds and All S Fitzwarren, ‘Clearing the Ground’ (2012) <www.eauk.org/current-
affairs/publications/upload/All-Contributors-CTG.pdf> accessed 10 June 2014; 
Prakash Shah, ‘Asking About Reasonable Accommodation in the Context of 
Religious Universalism’ (Queen May University of London, 2013) Queen Mary 
University of London, School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper 134/2013, 1 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2243375> accessed 20 August 
2014. 
41 [2005] EWCA Civ 932 [71] (Rix LJ): ‘It seems to me that it is possible and 
necessary to contemplate that an employer who seeks to change an employee's 
working hours so as to prevent that employee from practising his sincere adherence to 
the requirements of his religion in the way of Sabbath observance may be acting 
unfairly if he makes no attempt to accommodate his employee's needs.’ Also at para 
72: ‘It seems to me that if respect for the right to manifest one's religion is to have 
meaning in a democratic society, it is not possible to say that an employer who, in the 
given situation, would simply ignore any need to seek a reasonable accommodation 
would be acting fairly.’ 
42 Bull (n 24) [45]-[51]. 
43 Francesco Sessa v Italy App no 28790/08 (ECtHR, 3 April 2012). 
44 Erica Howard, ‘Reasonable Accommodation of Religion and Other Discrimination 
Grounds in EU Law’ (2013) 38 E L Rev, 360. 
45 Moon (n 21); Briobosia (n 37) 144-50; Gibson (n 23) 593-7. 
46 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982, ss 1, 15. 
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and 1985 Canadian Human Rights Act.47 In outline, once a religious belief has 
been identified, as in English law it must be recognised as sincere48 and must 
be the basis of the discrimination complained of. Employers are obliged to 
protect their employees’ religious rights without “undue interference” in those 
rights.49 Any discriminatory measure is subject to a now standard test. The 
employer must show, on the balance of probabilities, “(1) that the employer 
adopted the standard for a purpose rationally connected to the performance of 
the job; (2) that the employer adopted the particular standard in an honest and 
good faith belief that it was necessary to the fulfilment of that legitimate 
work-related purpose; and (3) that the standard is reasonably necessary to the 
accomplishment of that legitimate work-related purpose.”50  
Lest this balancing act result in the scales of justice becoming stuck in the 
middle, the key to the Canadian model is that “to show that the standard 
is reasonably necessary, it must be demonstrated that it is impossible to 
accommodate individual employees sharing the characteristics of the claimant 
without imposing undue hardship upon the employer.”51  
Factors to be taken into account in assessing “undue hardship”, in a non-
exhaustive list, include financial cost, any disruption of a collective 
agreement, morale problems for other employees, the inter-changeability of 
workforce and facilities, the size of the employer, and safety.52  
It is noticeable how high a threshold the employer faces to justify his 
discriminatory measure: it must be impossible to accommodate individual 
employees without undue hardship on the part of the employer. By 
comparison, in the United States the reasonable accommodation hurdle is set 
extremely low: undue hardship in federal law53 means, in the context of 
47 Canadian Human Rights Act 1985, s 2 mandates that ‘all individuals should have 
an opportunity to equal with other individuals to make for themselves the lives that 
they are able and wish to have and to have their needs accommodated, consistent with 
their duties and obligations as members of society, without being hindered or 
prevented from doing so by discriminatory practices based on…religion…’ 
48 Lord Nicolls in Wilkinson (n 34) was quoting a Canadian case.  
49 Ontario Human Rights Commission (O’Malley) v Simpson Sears [1985] 2 SCR 536 
[23] (Mr Justice McIntyre). 
50 British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations Comm) v BCGEU [1999] 3 
SCR 3 [54] (Justice McLachlin). 
51 BCGEU (n 51) [54] (Justice McLachlin): ‘The elevated standard is not to give 
undue recognition to religious interests; rather, it is to force courts to engage with all 
the relevant issues so as to resolve whether, and if so how far, an accommodation 
should have been made.’ 
52 Central Alberta Dairy Pool v Alberta (Human Rights Commission) [1990] 2 SCR 
489. 
53 Civil Rights Act 1964, Title VII 42 USCC 21 701(j). 
291 
 
                                                     
CASE COMMENTARY 
religious discrimination, “more than a de minimis cost” on the part of the 
employer.54  
One of the principal benefits of the Canadian model is that the balancing 
of reasonable accommodation can happen at both an individual and group 
level without the cumbersome procedure in reg 3, and is therefore much more 
like Lady Hale’s current preference in the Convention. All three Lord Justices 
in Mba were concerned to move away from the need to consider the numbers 
of adherents holding a particular belief. They sought to be sensitive to “the 
diversity of beliefs between and within religions, which flows from the 
respect that is accorded to the range of sincerely held religious beliefs.”55 The 
reasonable accommodation test clearly places the burden of proving the 
impossibility of accommodation onto the shoulders of the employer and 
removes the need for the employee to adduce evidence of other employees 
affected.  
Whereas the first three limbs of the test allow broad application to a wide 
variety of factual matrices, the factors to be taken into account when 
evaluating undue hardship mean that the case law is ultimately narrower and 
more structured, giving more security and certainty to employers and 
employees alike. The reasonable accommodation test is squarely presumptive 
in favour of the employee, unlike the proportionality test which always begs 
the question, “proportionate to what?”, and thus tends towards obliging 
employers to make the minimum effort not to disadvantage the employee. In 
doing so, reasonable accommodation moves the analysis from individuals and 
their characteristics to the context or environment in which they exist, and 
sharpens the focus of the exercise onto the dignity and autonomy of the 
worker. It points towards substantive equality in the workplace, where 
employees are aided in their pursuit of moral needs, rather than a bland or 
formal equality that is the by-product of desiccated legal reasoning.56 
54 Trans World Airlines v Hardison (1977) 432 US 63; On US reasonable 
accommodation: Bribosia (n 37) 139-44; Gibson (n 23) 596.  
55 Mba (n 1) [14] with emphasis in original. 
56 Bribosia (n 37): ‘Reasonable accommodation is based on a fundamental 
observation: some individuals, because of an inherent characteristic they have, such as 
disability or religion, are prevented from performing a task or from accessing certain 
spaces in conventional ways. Since society is organised primarily on the basis of 
people who do not share those traits, the former may be unable to access employment, 
services, or other activities. Hence, the interaction between an individual’s 
characteristics and the physical, social or normative environment ultimately deprives 
him/her of the advantages of an employment or of a service which, in principle, 
should be open to everyone.’ 
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The reasonable accommodation test is admittedly not without its 
downsides, none of which are insurmountable hurdles.57 On its own, a 
positive obligation to accommodate religion or belief would potentially create 
privilege over other protected characteristics (except, as the law currently 
stands, for disability). But this is an argument for extending reasonable 
accommodation to all protected grounds. As Lady Hale explained in both her 
lecture and judgment in Bull, the reasonable accommodation test does not 
necessarily assist Christians who deny the provision of goods and services to 
others.58 Whilst it may be tempting to limit reasonable accommodation to 
Lady Hale’s first category of cases and not the second (thus sidestepping the 
“clash” of equalities Regulations)59 that would still leave a large area of law 
open to be considered under the existing and unsatisfactory indirect 
discrimination mechanism.60 It is possible that there may be religions or 
beliefs which qualify for protection even though they may be reasonably 
thought of as pernicious, and it is unclear (following Nicholson) whether 
political beliefs would fall within the protections – yet both of these criticisms 
are true of the legal status quo.  
Moreover, the reasonable accommodation test sharpens scrutiny on the 
practical, real relationships between employer and employee, and does not 
dress this balance up in abstractions. As Lady Hale put it when advocating the 
Convention approach over the EU law approach, “Courts and tribunals have a 
natural eye for what they see as the merits of the case. If they think that there 
is a good reason for a difference in treatment they will try and find a reason 
why it is not unlawful.”61 The reasonable accommodation test gives more 
latitude to apply that “natural eye” and, in doing so, it points in spirit towards 
an objective assessment of competing interests. It thereby takes the sting out 
of Laws’ LJ remark that “[t]he conferment of any legal protection or 
preference upon a particular substantive moral position on the ground only 
that it is espoused by the adherents of a particular faith, however long its 
tradition, however rich its culture, is deeply unprincipled; it imposes 
57 Gwyneth Pitt, ‘Taking Religion Seriously’ (2013) 42 ILJ 398, 405-6; Aileen 
McColgan, ‘Class Wars? Religion and (In)equality in the Workplace’ (2009) 38 ILJ. 
58 Smith and Chymyshyn v Knights of Columbus and Others (2005) BCHRT 544 and 
Eadie and Thomas v Riverbend Bed and Breakfast and Others (No 2) (2012) BCHRT 
247, both cases before the British Columbia, Canada, Human Rights and broadly 
analogous to Bull (n 24) and Black (n 34). 
59 Bull (n 24); Black (n 34); R (Core Issues Trust) v  Transport for London (Secretary 
of State for Culture, Media and Sport and Minister for Women and Equalities 
Intervening) [2014] EWCA Civ 34. 
60 See Gibson (n 23).  
61 Ibid 5. 
293 
 
                                                     
CASE COMMENTARY 
compulsory law not to advance the general good on objective grounds, but to 
give effect to the force of subjective opinion”.62  
So, if the Canadian model were applied to Mrs Mba’s case, would the 
outcome have been any different? 
 
REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION APPLIED TO MRS 
MBA’S CASE 
 
The EAT distilled the background to the council’s policy of contractually 
obliging staff to work on Sundays as follows. Brightwell provided an 
important community care function which required continuity of care “insofar 
as possible”, as a lack of such continuity increased the risks of significant 
behavioural changes in children going unnoticed. National standards required 
minimum levels of staffing experience and provision for both male and 
female workers at all times. There were set patterns for daily shifts and 
weekly and monthly rotas which provided alternative 24-hour cover by three 
(or sometimes four) members of staff, which Brightwell’s management were 
adamant that it was “not possible to alter”. There were only five full-time 
members of staff when Brightwell was established for nine personnel; agency 
and locum staff were hired as necessary, but this was a more expensive 
option, especially for weekend cover. Mrs Mba’s employment contract 
included the duty of working on occasional Sundays.63 
The EAT summarised the tribunal’s findings on the council’s legitimate 
aim in its policy of “ensuring (a) an appropriate gender balance on each shift, 
(b) an appropriate seniority mix on each shift, (c) a cost-effective service in 
the face of budgetary constraints, (d) fair treatment of all its staff, and (e) 
continuity of care in staff looking after the children at the Brightwell”.64  
The council also submitted (in their internal appeal process) that it was 
“concerned about the impact of continuing on a permanent basis to 
accommodate [Mrs Mba’s] request not to work Sundays. It limited flexibility. 
It affected other staff. They would have to cover Sunday shifts 
disproportionately, and it would reduce their opportunity to have a full week’s 
leave. It was more costly to the council. It provided less well-trained staff, 
since agency staff would have to cover and they were less well trained. Thus 
the quality and continuity of service to children with disabilities would not 
always be so high.” The more limited use of agency and locum staff was also 
sought by the council. The conclusion was that “[w]here possible, requests in 
62 McFarlane v Relate Avon Limited [2010] EWCA Civ 880 [21]. 
63 Ms C Mba (n 6) [4]-[8].  
64 Ibid [18]. 
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respect of faith days would be accommodated but specific days off as a matter 
of routine could not…be accommodated.” 65  
Mrs Mba’s claim to religious freedom in respect of her Sabbatarian belief 
was in the context that she had a sincere belief that was worthy of respect, and 
that that belief was a manifestation of her faith that was a fundamental part of 
her autonomy and human dignity. More specifically, she suggested to the 
tribunal and EAT that there were ways the council could circumvent the 
problem: using agency or bank workers, recruiting an additional female 
permanent employee, scheduling one of two other female employees or an 
experienced locum to cover Sundays, or redeploying members from a related 
team in the council.66  
Applying the arguments on both sides to the Canadian test, it is more 
likely than not that Mrs Mba’s case would have been decided differently and 
that her Sabbatarianism would have been reasonably accommodated. 
Although the council applied the obligation of Sunday working for a purpose 
rationally connected to the continued and smooth running of Brightwell, and 
that the council acted in an honest and good faith belief that the obligation 
was necessary for the fulfilment of that work-related purpose, it was less than 
likely that the obligation was reasonably necessary for that purpose. This is 
because, it is submitted, the council could not show that it would be 
impossible67 to accommodate Mrs Mba without imposing undue hardship, for 
the following reasons. 
 
(a) Although the tribunal did not delve deeply into the council’s finances, 
the marginal financial cost of one additional employee to a London 
borough to cover Mrs Mba’s Sunday working is likely to be minimal 
(if not de minimis). The problem for the council was not the cost of 
employing a full-time member or members of staff, but in the extra 
expense of temporary and agency staff, which they were reluctant to 
employ.  
 
(b) Although the impact on staff morale was a concern, it is far from 
certain that it would have been impossible to ameliorate through 
proper and effective personnel management by the council. There is 
no competing protected characteristic that is mutually exclusive with 
Mrs Mba’s religious freedom. No collective agreement or other trade 
union compact was claimed to affect the council’s relationship with 
65 Ms C Mba (n 6) [19]. 
66 Ibid [21]. 
67 See Mba (n 1) [24] for a stricter test than the remark of Maurice Kay LJ that there 
was ‘really no viable or practicable alternative way of running Brightwell effectively’.  
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Mrs Mba. It was likely that, should Mrs Mba’s case be resolved 
pragmatically in her favour, positive public relations would accrue to 
the council as a consequence.  
 
(c) There were clear arguments for interchangeability of staff, as Mrs 
Mba’s counsel argued throughout, and several other reasonable 
options lay open to the council (albeit at varying levels of expense). 
The employer was a large entity with an associated “outreach” team 
which could have provided alternative staff cover. 
 
(d) So far as legal obligations on the employer were concerned, there was 
no evidence it would have been impossible to take accommodating 
steps without compromising safety. These measures could, in all 
likelihood, have been taken in such way as to comply with national 
minimum standards.  
 
(e) Mrs Mba had already been allowed to not work on Sundays for over 
two years, showing that a reasonable adjustment could be made to the 
council’s staff roster and subsequently undermining the council’s 
claim that it was “not possible to alter” staff shift patterns. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
There is always an uneasy dynamic in English law, as judges expand the 
scope of religious protections in some directions whilst narrowing them in 
others in response to cultural changes.68 In the limited circumstances of Mrs 
Mba’s case at least, it is time to move from the negative injunction – “do not 
interfere without justification in a protected right” – to the positive duty of 
reasonable accommodation.69  
68 This is sharply shown in the changed attitude and protections given to the Church 
of Scientology between the Court of Appeal in R v Registrar General, Ex parte 
Segerdal and Another [1970] 2 QB 697 (CA) and the Supreme Court in R (Hodkin 
and Another) v Registrar General of Births, Deaths and Marriages [2014] AC 610 
(SC), which redefined Scientology as a religion and thus allowed the registration of 
Scientology buildings as places for the valid conduct of marriage ceremonies. Lord 
Toulson pithily noted how cultural and normative change shaped the acceptability of 
Scientology as a form of religious worship (at [61]): ‘In my view the meaning given 
to worship in Segerdal was unduly narrow, but even if it was not unduly narrow in 
1970, it is unduly narrow now.’ 
69 In a speech to the Law Society of Ireland on 13 June 2014, which largely re-iterated 
her comments at Yale, Lady Hale appeared to suggest that the right of reasonable 
accommodation could provide an overarching test that draw in and unified the many 
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This takes religious protections away from the “specific circumstances” 
defence used by employers, who argue that employees put themselves 
voluntarily in a position where their religious freedoms are curtailed. 
Employees who cannot square such restrictions with their conscience should 
quit and find another job – a particularly pernicious idea in a time of high 
unemployment and an ever more specialised labour market and one explicitly 
rejected by the Strasbourg court in Eweida.70  
In an increasingly diverse society with more religions and beliefs finding 
legal protection, employers risk losing valued staff and employees risk 
becoming ostracised from mainstream employment, creating social silos as 
people congregate by creed in the workplace.  
As a matter of public policy, this is very undesirable. Given the judicial 
push for a more individualised set of anti-discrimination religious protections 
and the complexities in contemporary anti-discrimination law, it is time for 
the reasonable accommodation of religious freedom to be revisited. 
‘different strands’ of protections for freedom of religion and belief. She also hinted 
that Mrs Mba’s case may yet be appealed to the UK Supreme Court. Lady Hale (n 
22). 
70 Eweida  (n 14) [83]: ‘Given the importance in a democratic society of freedom of 
religion, the Court considers that, where an individual complains of a restriction on 
freedom of religion in the workplace, rather than holding that the possibility of 
changing job would negate any interference with the right, the better approach would 
be to weigh that possibility in the overall balance when considering whether or not the 
restriction was proportionate.’ 
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